The invention relates to a method for the accelerated contactless readout of an electronic identification document by means of a terminal.
An electronic identification document within the meaning of the invention comprises at least a microprocessor chip in which identification data of the person to whom the identification document is allocated are stored in a form encrypted with a data key, and a key memory in which the key employed for encrypting the identification data is stored. As electronic identification document particularly an electronic passport or an electronic identification card (e.g. electronic identity card) can be provided.
Electronic identification documents are read out in contactless fashion in large quantities by terminals (writing/reading devices), e.g. at border controls or other control stations, such as provided e.g. at airports, for the purpose of identity checking Therein the identification data from the data memory of the identification document are transmitted in contactless fashion to the terminal, decrypted with the key somewhere, and checked in the terminal.
Recommended mechanisms for secured communication between machine-readable travel documents, such as e.g. electronic passports, and corresponding terminals are described in the Technical Guideline TR-03110, version V 2.05, of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI, Federal Agency for Security in Information Technology) (BSI Technical Guideline TR-03110, version V 2.05; Technische Richtlinie TR-03110, Version V 2.05; hereinafter referred to as BSI TR-03110). In the BSI TR-03110 in particular mechanisms are described for authentication between the terminal and a microprocessor chip of the travel document, as well as mechanisms for agreeing and deriving common session keys between the terminal and the microprocessor chip of the machine-readable travel document. In BSI TR-03110 in chapter 4 there is stated in particular: in chapter 4.2 the PACE protocol (PACE=Password Authenticated Connection Establishment) describing the mutual authentication and (optional EC, elliptic curve) Diffie-Hellman key agreement for agreeing session keys between the microprocessor chip and the terminal; in chapter 4.3 the chip authentication, with an authentication of the microprocessor chip to the terminal and agreement of session keys from which data keys can be derived. Therein both the microprocessor chip and the terminal generate respectively a first session key KMAC, which is employed for authentication between the chip and the terminal, and generate a second session key KENC, from which subsequently a transport key KSE is derived, with which data to be transmitted between the chip and the terminal are encrypted.
DE 10 2005 038 092 A1 discloses a method for the machine-checking of data electronically stored in a passport book.
DE 100 37 176 C2 discloses an identity card as electronic identification document, having an optical memory and an integrated circuit, wherein in the optical memory personalized data are stored in encrypted form, encrypted with a cryptographic key that is stored in the integrated circuit of the identity card. The identity card is to be read out by an external reading/writing device (terminal). For this purpose the integrated circuit carries out an authentication check of the writing/reading device and, after positive authentication check, releases the key for transmission to the writing/reading device The personalized data stored in encrypted form in the optical memory are transmitted to the writing/reading device for decryption with the key.
An identity check by means of electronic identification documents with the method described in DE 100 37 176 C2 is time-consuming, since an authentication of the terminal must be carried out first, then the key must be read out, and finally the identification data must be read out and decrypted.
The readout of integrated circuits in electronic identification documents usually takes place in a contactless fashion using RFID technology (RFID: radio-frequency identification) in the short-range radio range, more exactly in the proximity coupling range that comprises ranges of up to maximally around 15 centimeters, at a transmission frequency of mostly 13.56 MHz, corresponding to ranges of around 7 to 15 centimeters. The communication for identification cards in the short-range proximity coupling radio range is standardized in ISO/IEC 14443. The short range offers protection against the spying out of data while they are being radio-transmitted.
Especially in the area of logistics and warehousing by means of RFID labels, contactless communication in the long-range radio range is employed, with operating frequencies in the area of a few gigahertz and ranges of a few meters, typically 3-6 meters. For communication between electronic devices long-range radio connections in the UHF range are employed, with operating frequencies within the area of a small number of GHz, and ranges within the area of a few tens of meters up to a few hundred meters, e.g. WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network), with an operating frequency of e.g. 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz, or IrDA (Infrared Data Association). The long ranges facilitate an interception of transmitted data during the radio transmission, for which reason long-range radio connections are disadvantageous for the transmission of security-critical data.